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THE JUDICIAL EXPERIMENT WITH
PRIVATIZING RELIGION
Gerard V Bradleyt
I. INTRODUCTION
1984 was the high water mark of the U.S. Supreme Court's campaign to
privatize religion-to strip public life bare of the sacred.' It may also prove to
be the mid-point: the "naked public square" was mandated by the Supreme
Court in 1962, and there is good reason to think that now, in 2007, the Court
might finally put an end to their misbegotten experiment.
"Privatization" of religion is tantamount to "secularism." Neither term
denotes atheism, the claim that there is no God and that religion is, basically, an
illusion. Privatization and secularism refer not to the denial of God, but to the
claim that the relevant activity-e.g., governing-should proceed as ifthere is
no God. Historian Jon Butler suggests that secularization typically means "the
essential disappearance of religion from public life despite its presence, even a
vital presence, in private life."2
In constitutional law the privatization (or secularist) project is carried out
doctrinally through the three-part Lemon test.3 Other doctrinal carriers include
the so-called "endorsement" test,4 which holds that religion may never be
endorsed by public authority as good, valuable, or desirable compared to (what
is usually called) "non-religion., 5 Another expression of the Court's secularist
mandate is that the state must always be "neutral" as between belief and
unbelief, and must never favor religious adherents collectively over non-
adherents." 6  These themes have dominated the Court's church and state
jurisprudence since 1962.
It is almost correct to say that the Supreme Court introduced these themes in
revolutionary fashion in the 1962 school-prayer case, Engel v. Vitale.7 Almost,
t Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame Law School; B.A. 1976, J.D., 1980,
Cornell University.
1. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v.
Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985); Wallace
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
2. Jon Butler, Jack-in-the-Box Faith: The Religion Problem in Modern American
History, 90 J. AM. HiST. 1360 (2004).
3. Lemon v. Kurzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) ("[E]very act of public authority
must have a secular legislative purpose, must not (primarily) advance religion, and must
always keep religion and the state free of "excessive entanglement.").
4. See, Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
5. See, McCreary County, Ky. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
6. See, Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 696 (1994).
7. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1961).
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because the Court's privatization initiative was anticipated during a brief
"secular spring" in the late 1940's. First in dictum in the 1947 Everson
decision, 8 and then in the holding of McCollum9 a year later, the Court tried to
secularize public life. This privatizingputsch failed; I describe this false start
in Part I.
In Part II we see that in 1952, in Zorach v. Clauson,' the Court rejected
McCollum and its secularist doctrinal baggage. The Zorach court once again
centered our constitutional law upon a creative partnership between religious
and governmental entities, an arrangement from which coercion of conscience
was barred and in which no religious group received special favors. But this
was not secularism. It was not the "naked public square." It was a stable
pluralism of publicly involved religions.
In Part III I show that, on the eve of the Court's watershed decision in Engel
v. Vitale, constitutional law across the country had recovered from the Court's
failed secularist campaign and had re-centered itself upon Zorach 's traditional
doctrines of free and equal cooperation between church and state.
In Part IV I take a closer look at the Engel holding of 1962, and try to
determine what the Court intended with that grand departure.
In the Conclusion I explain why 2007 might be the year of reckoning for the
"naked public square" decreed in Engel.
II. FALSE START OF PRIVATIZATION IN THE 1940s
Engel v. Vitale launched the privatization campaign in 1962. The Court's
decision was doctrinally breathtaking and its result a shock to our politics.
Although Engel was not woven from whole cloth, its roots in Supreme Court
holdings were, however, quite thin: McCollum and little else besides expansive
dictum in Everson. The central passage of Everson claimed that the
Establishment Clause stood for the proposition that neither the states nor the
federal government may aid religion, even if there is no discrimination among
sects, and even where no coercion is alleged." The Everson court asserted that
the "Amendment requires the state to be neutral in its relations with groups of
religious believers and non-believers.' 12 It is fair to say that these and similar
passages implied the propriety of government secularization. But these
comments were dictum, because the "believers" won in Everson on entirely
8. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
9. McCollum v. Rd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
10. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
11. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16.
12. Id. at 18.
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different grounds, namely free bus rides to and from Catholic school were a
child benefit-they were not aids to the school.
Everson was a curious platform for such bold pronouncements, even in
dictum. The case had neither been briefed nor argued as an Establishment
Clause dispute. The issue brought to the Supreme Court was a Due Process
question: whether New Jersey's paying for Catholic school children's bus rides
was a public expenditure for a "private" purpose. The most relevant case was
Cochran.13 Cochran involved a Louisiana textbook loan dispute, decided in
1930 in favor of aid to Catholic schools.
Justice Black's opinion for the Everson Court went through at least three
draft stages, each one a qualitative doctrinal leap from the preceding draft(s).
At first, Black would have ruled in favor of the school kids on the strength of
Cochran. Under pressure from separationist brethren, his second draft
"incorporated" the Establishment Clause. Black said in this installment that the
Establishment Clause henceforth inhibits the acts of all public authorities-
national, state, and local--subject to the Constitution's authority. Black wrote,
however, that non-establishment required equality among religions. He did not
say or imply that the state had to be neutral between religion and "non-
religion." In other words, thus far, Black adhered to traditional non-
establishment doctrine; the only real innovation was the "incorporation" move.
Finally, Black circulated the opinion which went into the books, setting out
the secularist construct:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the federal government can
set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid
all religions, or prefer one religion over another.... No tax in any
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever
form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.... In the words
of Jefferson, "The clause against establishment of religion by law
was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and
State."14
All of Black's doctrinal logrolling came to naught. The separationist
Justices who pushed him---chiefly Frankfurter and Rutledge--ended up
dissenting anyway.
13. Cochran v. Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
14. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16.
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Where did all the secularist rhetoric of Everson come from? As his reference
to Jefferson suggests,' 5 from long ago. Black's opinion is suffused with tales of
heroic, freedom-loving colonials, shepherded to the light by the far-seeing
Madison and Jefferson.' 6 But the whole display of historical learning is either
irrelevant to the meaning of the federal Establishment Clause, patently false, or
both.
Where else might the secularist exhortations come from? The impetus came,
in part, from Frankfurter and Rutledge, who relentlessly hammered away at
Black's drafts, pushing all the way for a "strict separationist" decision.17 We
learn, too, from one of Black's biographers that he relied for his stirring rhetoric
upon a 1943 volume by Charles Beard.'8 Beard wrote in his 1943 book, The
Republic: "The Constitution is a purely secular document.... [I]t treats
religion as a private matter, extraneous to the interests of the Federal
government." 19 Black wrote to a friend of "this great book," whose title might
almost have been, Black opined, "The Origin and Aim of the American
Constitution."20
What Beard said was, very strictly speaking, largely true. The un-amended
Constitution mentions religion by name once: to ban religious tests for federal
office.21 No power over religion was given to the new government, and early
drafts of the First Amendment included proposals declaring that "Congress had
no power over religion." However, that was the case because the national
government possessed no general police power at all. Power over religion (and
over education and family matters and public health) was part of the police
power, and it was reserved to the States. Thus the truth of Beard's observation
owes to the federal structure of the union, not to a separationist doctrine
embraced by anti-clerical colonials as a norm of public morality. In fact, where
the national government did enjoy a measure of police power-in the
territories, for example-we see that public authority (always a matter of
delegated congressional authority) possessed the power to promote religion-
and used it.
22
15. Id. at 16.
16. See id. at 11-13.
17. ROGER K. NEWMAN, HuGo BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 362-63 (2d ed. 1997).
18. Id.
19. CHARLES A. BEARD, THE REPUBLIC 166 (1943).
20. Newman, supra note 17, at 363.
21. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
22. For a full account of the Establishment Clauses origins in Congress see GERARD V.
BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA (1987).
[Vol. 1:1
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Black's adoption of Beard was doubly mistaken. First, by 1947, it was no
longer true that the national government lacked a police power within the
states-Prohibition and the New Deal had seen to that. Second, Black applied
this outdated conception of the limited competency of the national government
to the states-i.e., incorporation-whose police power had always included a
competence to care for the common good in religion. But Everson displaced
police power to promote religion, until Zorach23 restored it four years later. In
between Everson and Zorach is the case upon which the Engel Court greatly
relied.
The weaknesses of Everson's reasoning, and the apparent incongruity of its
outcome with that reasoning, rendered the case ambiguous, if not simply
confusing. What had the Court said? Where was it going with the new
departure in church-state law? When the Court agreed to decide during the
next term whether local religious leaders could provide voluntary religious
instruction in public schools, all interested eyes turned to watch.
In McCollum, a local free-thinker named Vashti McCollum sued
Champaign, Illinois, schools on behalf of her son. 4 Vashti's beliefs, or the
son's, or the beliefs of them both obliged the boy to wait outside the classroom
while sectarian instruction took place. The Illinois courts upheld the local
practice.25 The Supreme Court reversed.26
"Champaign's lawyers argued that Everson's expansive language was
dictum," not binding in McCollum, 27 and these lawyers supplied the briefing
Everson lacked. They argued in a masterful 168-page submission authored by
John Franklin that nonestablishment did not entail secularism, the godless
public square, or privatization by any other description. 28 The other side
responded with briefs nearly as able. A full dress rehearsal of all the relevant
history was placed before the Court. The central question-whether the
Establishment Clause originally meant sect equality and thus permitted
promotion of religion as such, or whether it required neutrality between belief
and unbelief-was never before so well presented and it has never been so well
presented in the fifty-six years since.
23. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
24. Interestingly, another of the McCollum boys-Daniel-grew up to be Mayor of
Champaign.
25. See McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 71 N.E.2d 161 (1947).
26. See McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
27. Gerard V. Bradley, The Prodigal Argument: McCollum v. Board of Education, 5
ENGAGE: THE JOURNAL OF THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY'S PRACTICE GROUPS 131 (2004).
28. Id. Franklin challenged incorporation, too, but with much less vigor.
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Hugo Black, author of Everson, wrote for the Court in McCollum. He laid
out Franklin's contentions: dictum, dis-incorporation, and-by far the most
urgently pressed-that "historically the First Amendment was intended to
forbid only government preference of one religion over another, not an
impartial governmental assistance of all religions."
29
The Court's response: "After giving full consideration to the arguments
presented we are unable to accept either of these contentions."3 The dictum of
Everson became law in McCollum.
The nation's religious leaders responded to McCollum as a clarion call to
action. A typical response is recorded in John McGreevy's excellent book,
Catholicism and American Freedom.3 1  McGreevy himself asserts that
McCollum "erected a putative 'wall of separation' between church and state.
32
He reports on an "off-the-record meeting of religious leaders held in the wake"
of the decision. 3 At the meeting, John Courtney Murray, one of the leading
American Catholic intellectuals of that (or any) other time, "emphasized that
the McCollum decision was a victory for secularism and as such should be of
great concern to Catholics, Jews and Protestants."
34
It was. But religion got its revenge just four years later, in Zorach v.
Clauson.
III. SHIFT BACK TO A PLURALISM OF PUBLICLY INVOLVED RELIGIONS
Zorach was the "Released Time" case from New York City. "Released
Time" usually occurred on Wednesday afternoons, but whenever it occurred
public school children were "released" early-at parental request-to receive
religious instruction at a nearby parochial school.35 "Released time" was almost
wholly a Catholic thing, though no legal restriction made it so. No religious
instruction occurred on public property. But public school authorities kept
records, supervised early dismissal, tolerated "down time" while so many
students were absent, and otherwise promoted what amounted to catechetical
instruction.
The Zorach court offered no support for forcing religion upon anyone. But,
so long as that freedom was preserved-and neutrality in the "competition
29. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 211.
30. Id.
31. JOHN T. MCGREEVY, CATHOLICISM AND AMERICAN FREEDOM (2003).
32. Id. at 205.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 308 (1952).
[Vol. 1: 1
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between sects' '36 was maintained-anything more would, Zorach said, show
"hostility" to religion,37 "callous indifference to religious groups, 3 8 and prefer
non-believers.39
Could a position of "neutrality" between religion and nonreligion really be
considered to show hostility towards religion as the Zorach court declared?
Was the Court's pronouncement an exaggeration or a fit of pique? Even if one
claims that it is an exaggeration, it is important to see that the expression-
"neutrality between religion and nonreligion"--is quite misleading. In truth,
the deliverance of McCollum and Engel (and beyond) was rather nonreligion as
the "neutral" ground between religion and irreligion or, perhaps, nonreligion as
the only ground which a religiously diverse society, one moving towards
notions of secularism or the "naked public square," could safely occupy.
I think the best sense to be made of Zorach's "pique" is this: there is a
natural and good connection between God and public life, one which arises
from the nature of religion and the nature of public life, a connection verified
by experience and common sense. To stifle or to cork this organic
efflorescence is an unnatural and wrong-headed intervention. Being
unnatural-that is, artificial, posited, an act of human will-Zorach may be
saying that it must express some negativity towards religion. Perhaps it is best
to understand the Zorach court to have said that there is, as an objective matter,
a common good in religion, and that any stipulation of public authority to the
contrary is, or can only be understood as being rooted in, some negative story
about religion.
The Zorach court said that there "cannot be the slightest doubt that the First
Amendment reflects the philosophy that Church and State should be
separated." 40 That Amendment, "however, does not say that in every and all
respects there shall be a separation." "Rather, it studiously defines the manner,
the specific ways, in which there shall be no concert or union or dependency
one on the other."41 This is "common sense." "Otherwise the state and religion
would be aliens to each other-hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly."4
2
Black, Frankfurter, and Jackson dissented.43
36. Id. at 314.
37. Id. at 315.
38. Id. at 314.
39. Id. at 315.
40. Id. at 312.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 315-25.
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Zorach was unmistakably at odds with the separationist doctrine of
McCollum and like dictum of Everson. Zorach's "accommodationism"--as it
swiftly came to be called-became the law of the land.44
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW NATIONWIDE RE-CENTERS ON
ZORACH APPROACH
The first important post-Zorach judicial decision was Tudor v. Bd. ofEduc. 45
There the New Jersey Supreme Court forbade school officials to distribute
Gideon's Bibles. The court noted the continuing debate over a "wall of
separation," and said: "The plaudits and the criticisms of the various majority,
concurring, and dissenting opinions" of Everson, McCollum, and Zorach "still
continue. 46 Though its holding rested on sect-preference grounds and though
it distinguished Zorach, the New Jersey court was inclined to the stricter
church-state view expressed in McCollum. Even so: "This is more than mere
'accommodation' of religion permitted in the Zorach case. The school's part in
this distribution is an active one and cannot be sustained on the basis of a mere
assistance to religion.
'47
Cases coming after Tudor characteristically viewed Everson's expansive
language as mere dictum. These subsequent cases by and large zeroed in on
Everson's holding in favor of aid to religious education, limited McCollum to
its facts, and took Zorach's accommodationism to be the controlling principle
of federal constitutional law.
Among these cases is Carden v. Bland,48 in which the Tennessee Supreme
Court upheld a statute compelling teachers to read from the Bible every day.
The court read Everson as sanctioning state favor towards religion. The court
concluded: "we think that the highest duty of those charged with the
responsibility of training the young people of this state in the public schools is
in the teaching both by precept and example that in the conflicts of life they
should not forget God."49
In 1957 the California Supreme Court took Zorach 's side over Everson.50
First Unitarian Church v. County ofLos Angeles involved a state constitutional
provision which made the grant of a tax exemption to a religious organization
44. Id.
45. Tudor v. Bd. of Educ., 100 A.2d 857 (N.J. 1953).
46. Id. at 864.
47. Id. at 868.
48. Carden v. Bland, 288 S.W.2d 718 (Tenn. 1956).
49. Id. at 725.
50. First Unitarian Church v. County of Los Angeles, 311 P.2d 508 (Cal. 1957).
[Vol. 1:1
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conditional on the group's non-advocacy of overthrow of the government.5 A
church group argued that this condition violated the Free Exercise Clause. In
disagreeing with the plaintiff's argument, the court drew a sharp distinction
between an absolute freedom to believe and freedom to act, which cannot be
absolute and remains subject to regulation for the protection of society. 2
But the court did not end its constitutional inquiry there. The court asserted
that "[t]here are decisions wherein provisions having some effect on religious
activity have been upheld on the ground that their effect was only incidental. '5 3
However, instead of citing Everson as the authority for this position, the court
cited Zorach, and then quoted its decision extensively. 54
The initial judicial opinion in Engel v. Vitale15 went deeply into the history
of both the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court concluded that even
though sectarian worship in public schools was eventually proscribed in the
states, such exclusion did not extend to the Bible or to non-compulsory
prayer.56 The court's diversion into history provides the backdrop to a decision
that significantly follows Zorach and ignores the reasoning in Everson,
McCollum, and even Tudor. The court stated that the Zorach decision
constituted a retreat from both Everson and McCollum: "where Everson...
outlawed aid to all religions, Zorach recognized that government can, without
violation, accommodate all religions.0 7 Zorach accommodated religion by
prohibiting indirect compulsion in matters of religion only when "the nexus
between government and religion thus produced is too close."58 In essence, the
Engel court favored Zorach by arguing that the First Amendment did not
require separation in every respect: "freedom 'of' religion does not mean
freedom 'from' religion. 59 Some form of prayer "would appear to fall within
the realm of permissible accommodation."60
Regarding school prayer the court said: "It is recited during opening
exercises rather than as part of any instructional period. It is phrased in
traditional prayer form rather than in any form normal for instructional
51. Id. at 511. See also CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 19.
52. Id. at 517.
53. Id. at 517-18.
54. See id.
55. Engel v. Vitale, 191 N.Y.S.2d 453 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959).
56. Id. at 472.
57. Id. at 485.
58. Id. at 486.
59. Id. at 487 (citing Gordon v. Bd. of Educ., 78 Cal. App. 2d 464, 476 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. (1947))).
60. Id. at 490.
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materials. ''61 This contrasts with the reasoning in the Tudor case, which held
that the practice of distributing Gideon Bibles in the schools was not a
permissible "accommodation" in part because of the psychological pressures
created when school authorities distribute the religious materials.
62
In Perry,63 the Supreme Court of Washington dealt with a release-time
program, and relied on the Zorach case as controlling precedent. 64 While it is
true that the Zorach decision was controlling authority on point because it dealt
with a release-time program similar to the one at issue in Perry, the court made
it clear that Zorach's reasoning embodied important First Amendment
principles by including in the body of the Perry decision an unusually long
quotation from the Zorach opinion, the logic of which the court clearly
approved: "The reasoning of the Zorach case is sound and reflects the
reasoning of the state courts which have passed upon the same question .... ,,96
The quote is noteworthy because the Perry court found the statute
unconstitutional, but apparently found Zorach more compelling than the dictum
in Everson. Again in Perry: "It was never the intention that our constitution be
construed in any manner indicating any hostility toward religion. Instead, the
safeguards and limitations were for the preservation of those rights.
66
Nowhere does Perry mention Everson.
In Carolina Amusement Co. v. Martin,67 the court ruled on the
constitutionality of Sunday blue laws. The court said that because Everson and
McCollum were not concerned with Sunday laws, neither case was applicable.68
The court then stated: "nor is the reasoning of them applicable." 9 Similarly,
the court admitted that Zorach, "the leading opinion," was not on point, but,
unlike the other cases, the reasoning of Zorach "indicate[d] the
constitutionality of Sunday observance laws. 70
The Engel case on first appeal took a similar position.71 Engel held that an
optional prayer before class was constitutional.72 As in several other cases, the
court treated Zorach as a way to break down the strict separation between
61. Id.
62. See Tudor v. Bd. of Educ., 100 A.2d 857, 866-67 (N.J. 1954).
63. Perry v. Sch. Dist. No. 81, 344 P.2d 1036 (Wash. 1959).
64. See id.
65. Id. at 1042.
66. Id. at 1043.
67. Carolina Amusement Co. v. Martin, 115 S.E.2d 273 (S.C. 1960).
68. Id. at 280.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Engel v. Vitale, 206 N.Y.S.2d 183 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960).
72. Id.
[Vol. 1:1
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church and state, thus further confining Everson. Introducing a long passage
from Zorach, the court claimed that the Zorach majority "gave to the nation
these basic principles for its guidance. 73 It would seem, then, that by 1960 the
authority of Everson had significantly eroded. Apparently few federal appellate
and state supreme courts feared being overturned for failing to follow, or even
cite, Everson.
The trend toward Zorach continued in Lewis v. Allen,74 another New York
case. The plaintiffs sued to revoke a regulation recommending use in public
schools of the Pledge of Allegiance, including the words "under God." The
court did little to explain why it found the regulation constitutional, other than
saying that students were not compelled to recite the Pledge. The court
explained that the Pledge does not illicitly blur the distinction between church
and state: "the doctrine of accommodation enunciated in Zorach v. Clauson"
justifies the incantation of "under God" because the school is merely
accommodating the expression of a religious view while permitting students to
omit the words "under God.,
75
A Supreme Court of Rhode Island decision, Archetto,76 dealt with the
constitutionality of statutes granting tax exemptions to religious organizations.
After methodically reviewing the Everson, McCollum, and Zorach decisions,
the court concluded that Everson's "forceful language" was "oddly in contrast
with the net effect of the court's decision., 77 Since Everson's forceful
separationist language was mere dictum, its legal import was doubtful.
However, the court seemed to hold that the "doubt" was wiped out by the
concrete application of Everson dictum in McCollum. But the broad
implications of McCollum, the court said, "have been more closely confined by
the decision in Zorach v. Clauson.78 In other words, by distinguishing the
facts in Zorach from those in McCollum, the Supreme Court confined
Everson's separationist language to the narrow fact pattern extant in McCollum:
"The opinion of the majority in McCollum ... on the facts operating therein,
is the law of the land.,
79
In Chamberlain,8 ° the Supreme Court of Florida was outspoken in its
complete rejection of Everson's separationist language. The case centered on a
73. Id. at 188.
74. Lewis v. Allen, 207 N.Y.S.2d 862 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960).
75. Id. at 866.
76. Gen. Fin. Corp. v. Archetto, 176 A.2d 73 (R.I. 1961).
77. Id. at 78.
78. Id.
79. Id. (emphasis added).
80. Chamberlain v. Dade County Bd. of Instruction, 143 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1962).
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statute requiring prayer and recitation of the Bible in public schools.8 1 Pupils
who objected were excused from attending. After quoting the relevant
language from Everson ("neither a state nor the federal government can set up a
church.. ."), the court remarked that the quoted language "has done little other
than cause confusion" and that the quoted paragraph must, "in the course of
time, be further receded from if weight is to be accorded the true purpose of the
First Amendment.
8 2
The court then undermined Everson's "wall of separation" in several ways.
First, it
attacked the Jeffersonian metaphor itself by pointing out that "the 'wall of
separation between church and State' that Mr. Jefferson built at the University
[of Virginia] did not exclude religious education from that school. 8 3 Next, the
court recognized Cooley, the nineteenth century constitutional law scholar, as
correctly capturing the purpose and meaning behind the First Amendment. The
court quoted favorably his views on the First Amendment: "[E]stablishment of
religion is the setting up or recognition of a state church, or at least the
conferring upon one church of special favors and advantages which are denied
to others. It was never intended by the Constitution that the government should
be prohibited from recognizing religion."'
84
The court applied its own theory of constitutional construction to find a
meaning of the First Amendment contrary to Everson's meaning. "It must be
the rule as to constitutions, just as to statutes, that there is 'no occasion for
construction' when the phrasing 'is entirely free from ambiguity.' "85 When
construction is required the goal is to find the intent of the framers: "The
fundamental purpose in construing [a constitution] is to ascertain and give
effect to the intent of the framers and of the people who adopted it .... "6
Keeping in mind these two principles of construction, the court then asked,
"what is the meaning of an 'establishment of religion'? 8 7 This question had
been answered by the United States Supreme Court in Cantwell v.
Connecticut8S: "[I]t forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any...
form of worship." 89 Lack of compulsion is one fundamental element of the
81. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 231.09 (1961).
82. Id. at 24-25.
83. Id. at 25.
84. Id. (quoting COOLEY, PRiNCiPLES OF CoNsTrruTIoNAL LAW 213-14 (2d ed. 1891)).
85. Chamberlain, 143 So. 2d at 26.
86. Id. at 30.
87. Id. at 31.
88. Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
89. Chamberlin, 143 So. 2d at 31 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303
(1940)).
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First Amendment. The other element is the prohibition against state
sponsorship of a church: "'Established' churches were well known to the
colonists, who had experienced them in Europe and America. They knew that
the phrase meant 'a state church,' such as, for instance, existed in
Massachusetts for more than forty years after the adoption of the
Constitution."9
By 1960, courts no longer strained reason to reconcile Everson and Zorach.
Besides the overall language and holdings of the cases, two concrete examples
drawn from the cases reflect the trend away from Everson. First, more than one
court during this time period viewed Everson as confusing because its final
decision contrasted with its separationist dictum. In the end, the lower courts
generally rejected the strong separationist language of Everson. Second, the
cases display a trend toward defining the First Amendment increasingly in
terms of a proscription against compelling religious practice.
The definition of compulsion changed during this time period. In Tudor the
court used testimony of psychologists to show that any involvement by school
authorities in religion operates as a subtle psychological compulsion or
influence on students. 91 Later cases narrowed the definition of compulsion,
refusing to include in its definition a psychological component. In
Chamberlain the court insisted that the First Amendment mandated only
freedom from "present compulsion requiring unwilling support of religion." 92
The Engel lower court similarly argued that "[t]o recognize 'subtle pressures'
as compulsion under the Amendment is to stray far afield from the oppressions
",93the Amendment was designed to prevent ....
V. ENGEL USHERS IN THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE
The law of non-establishment in place when the Supreme Court heard Engel
v. Vitale was not a wall of separation. It was a picket fence or, maybe, a chain-
link barrier permeated by considerable cooperation between church and state
for the purpose of mutual interest conducive to the common goal of the whole
community. This cooperation was constrained by norms against sect-preference
and coercion. Governments could promote, encourage, and even financially aid
religion, so long as the different religions were treated equally and so long as no
one was coerced.
90. Chamberlain, 143 So. 2d at 31 (citing CORWIN, CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS
TODAY 155-56 (9th ed. 1947)).
91. Tudor v. Bd. of Educ., 100 A.2d 857, 867 (N.J. 1953).
92. Chamberlain, 143 So. 2d at 29.
93. Engel v. Vitale, 191 N.Y.S.2d 453, 492 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959).
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A naked public square was nonetheless on the Engel petitioners' minds.
Their lawyer, William Butler, came before the Court to preserve religious
liberty, he said in oral argument, but the only way to do that was to "keep
religion out of our public life." 94 Later in the argument, Butler was asked: "is it
your position that our public schools, by virtue of our Constitution, are frankly
secular institutions?" He answered: "Absolutely yes." That was his "ultimate
position."95
Butler relied "very heavily" on McCollum. 96 He distinguished Zorach as an
off-premises religious observance.97 The Court, save for Justice Stewart,
seemed to be on his side. Stewart pressed him hard to distinguish the Regents'
prayer--"Almighty God we acknowledge our dependence on Thee"--from: "I
pledge allegiance to ... one nation under God., 98 Butler faltered, as he did
when pressed to distinguish other divine adornments of public life-"In God
We Trust," "God Save this Honorable Court," and the like. 99
Butler argued forcefully that informal social and psychological pressures
combined to vitiate kids' option not to participate in the Regents' prayer.'°
The Court would adopt the offering in later school-prayer cases, taking on
board an account of kids' susceptibility to "coercion" that would make any
genuine education a pipedream. But not in Engel-the Court's opinion put
aside coercion as irrelevant to the Establishment Clause inquiry. Butler was not
pressed hard on Zorach and how it effectively displaced McCollum as the law.
Why not is a good question. It seems that the Court had already decided to go
for the naked public square.
The defenders of the Regents' prayer made the contrast as clear as it could
be made. Bertram Daiker represented school officials and he said: "[H]ere is
where my friend [Butler] and I depart in our thinking. Since the earliest days of
this country, going back to the Mayflower Compact, the men who put our
country together have publicly and repeatedly recognized the existence of a
Supreme Being, a God." 01 Later on, Porter Chandler, on behalf of intervening
parents, said that petitioners "are now seeking to... eliminate all reference to
94. Transcript of Oral Argument at 11, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (No. 468).
95. Id. at 26.
96. Id. at 9.
97. Id. at 9-10.
98. Id. at 20-22.
99. Id. at 14-15.
100. See id. at 16.
101. Id. at 28.
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God from the whole fabric of our public life and of our public educational
system."'
0 2
The Engel Court set up the question clearly enough: "[n]either the fact that
the prayer may be denominationally neutral nor the fact that its observance on
the part of the students is voluntary can serve to free it from the limitations of
,,103the Establishment Clause, as it might from the Free Exercise Clause ....
The reach and point of the Establishment Clause are broader, and depend upon
no such showings. The point of that clause was to forestall "union" of
government and religion, to leave "that purely religious function to the people
themselves and to those the people choose to look to for religious guidance."' 4
But, should the "people" "choose" to look to public officials for such guidance,
they were out of luck. The Establishment Clause expresses the "principle" that
religion is "too personal, too sacred, too holy, to permit its 'unhallowed
perversion' by a civil magistrate"' 05---except that "unhallowed perversion" was
not a sorting tool. The Court's ruling made clear that whenever the civil
magistrate gets religion it is an "unhallowed perversion."
Justice Stewart, in dissent, could not see "how an 'official religion' is
established by letting those who want to say a prayer say it.' ' 10 6 He had pressed
Butler hard about the Pledge, and now worked the problem into his opinion.
The National Motto, the Star Spangled Banner, and "under God" were at stake.
The validity of them all, Stewart asserted, was "summed up by this Court just
ten years ago in a single sentence: 'We are a religious people whose
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.",
0 7
The Engel Court did not expressly overrule Zorach. In fact, New York City
had "released time" for decades thereafter, including my days at Mary Queen of
Heaven School in Brooklyn. But Engel shredded Zorach's reasoning and put
an end to the era of "accommodation. " To Zorach's notion that secularism
indicated hostility to religion, Engel replied: "Nothing, of course, could be
more wrong."'0 8 Why? Probably because religion does not naturally or rightly
manifest itself politically. Religion is private.
102. Id. at 42.
103. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,430 (1962).
104. Id. at 435.
105. Id. at 432 (quoting JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMOSTRANCE AGAINST
RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS 5 (1785)).
106. Id. at 445 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 450 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952)).
108. Engel, 370 U.S. at 434.
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Zorach had been received by later courts to say that "separation" was a
matter of "degree."' 1 9 Prudential judgments about how far to go had to be
made, but they were to be judgments which presupposed that moderate
cooperation and recognition of God were good things. No more. Engel set the
tone for twenty-two years ofjudicial hyper-scrupulousness by quoting Madison:
"It is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties."" The
principle of separation could tolerate no exceptions because-as the Court said
wholly without irony-steadfast consistency was the only alternative to
persecution.
The wellsprings of Engel are difficult to pin down. The opinion is absolute,
peremptory, confident, even strident. The drift of the oral argument suggests
that the matter was settled before then. So what happened? The Court offered
the usual stories about freedom-loving colonials, and the preciousness of
religious liberty.'' But so it had in Everson, and its dictum had ceased to
command allegiance a decade before Engel. The question then arises in a
different form: why did the Engel Court return to the separationist founding of
Everson, and disown the accommodationist founding of Zorach?
Engel said that it was not for government to compose official prayers. But
the next year's declarations against school Bible reading and saying the Lord's
Prayer ("Our Father, Who art in heaven . . . .,)112 reveal that to have been a
throwaway line.
It might be that some Justices came to believe sometime shortly before Engel
what Butler said at oral argument: liberty finds no refuge in a teeming,
religiously pluralistic public square.1 13 Someone holding this view could affirm
that religion is good, that one or more religions might be true, and even that
religion "naturally" expresses itself publicly. On this view, however, the
positive law would stipulate that a barrier be erected for the greater good. This
account represents a prudential judgment in light of circumstances and the
needs of the day. The judgment could even be quite defensible, all things
considered, in some contexts. But the judgment is itself provisional,
contingent, and-it seems to me--one which was never made by the Founders.
It is not a judgment which the First Amendment can be made to articulate, save
on the assumption that the First Amendment means judicial authority to enact
constitutional law.
109. See discussion supra Part III.
110. Engel, 370 U.S. at 436 (quoting Madison, supra note 105, at 3).
111. Seeid. at428-30.
112. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
113. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (No.
468).
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There is another possibility. It lies in the Court's understanding
(presuppositions or ideology) of religion. "Privatization" can be seen much less
as a campaign about or even against religion as it can be viewed as a judicial
attempt to redefine religion. It might well be that many mid-twentieth century
Justices believed that doctrine, churches, and institutional forms were inimical
to genuine spirituality. Religion was, in this perspective, the enemy of genuine
faith. The Court in the early 1960's relied upon Paul Tillich's emerging
philosophy of religion. 1 4 And, as Jon Butler recently wrote in the Journal of
American History: "Tillich's conviction that religion was, at its essence, a
philosophical and theological 'ground of being' whose redefined spiritual
centeredness could successfully confront modem totalitarianism, religious
bigotry, and racism even as it transcended the creedal orthodoxy and
denominational distinctiveness."'"1
5
VI. CONCLUSION
Religion has since Engel-and the 1984 high tide-hopped the picket fence
around the public square. The public square is now open to religious
expression. Cases beginning in 1993 (Lamb's Chapel'1 6 and, later,
Rosenberger' 17) nearly eradicated discrimination against religious speech,
institutions, and individuals as, or on the precise grounds of being, religious.
Where the religious activity (or speech or writing) can be assimilated to a class
of actions which can be described without reference to religion, constitutional
norms of viewpoint equality open wide the gates to the public forum. And so,
if a local public library sets up a lecture series on "family issues," it may not
exclude a speaker such as Dr. James Dobson because he brings a religious
perspective to the subject.
This is a real breakthrough. Engel's legacy had been that religion was
uniquely politically problematic. Because religion alone among ideologies,
viewpoints, and belief systems-the Court said for a while-fostered
divisiveness, oppression, and warfare, and because religion could not be
promoted even a bit by the state without ruin, the state had to keep it private.
But note well: though the Rosenberger breakthrough is very important and
though it has been fueled by reduced judicial hostility to religion, it is the
achievement of Free Speech and Free Press doctrine, not of the Religion
Clauses.
114. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 180, 187 (1965).
115. See Butler, supra note 2.
116. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
117. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
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Another recent sign of change is the Court's unanimous 2005 decision in
Cutter v. Wilkinson."' Cutter reversed a lower court holding against a
Congressional enactment titled, "The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Person Act"--RLUIPA. 119 Targeted at zoning and prison authorities, this law
requires them to justify, in a judicial proceeding, their refusal to excuse a
religious claimant from the strictures of a law, rule, or regulation which
diminishes the believer's ability to freely exercise his or her faith.
The constitutional challenge to RLUIPA was that it gave a prohibited
preference to believers over non-believers. There was, up to a point, a
preference for religion but it was not prohibited. Where Congressional favors
of this sort are concerned (states are a different matter), Professor Carl Esbeck
recently wrote that the one constitutional law is, and long has been, that such
preferences do not run afoul of the Establishment Clause.120 The Cutter Court
fell into line with this tradition.
Still another important development has to do with aid to religious schools.
The Court struck down a parochial school aid law for the first time in 1971.121
The most stringent of these decisions-the last of which occurred in 1985-
was Nyquist,122 in 1973. For some time now, the whole social and political
context of public aid to religious schools has radically changed. Since 1985 we
can see the steady development of a new (perhaps even a renewed) appreciation
for the critical importance of good education for success in today's economy;
for the intractability of underachievement in many public school systems; for
the educational achievements of religious schools; for the racial and even the
religious mix of students in those schools; for the role of choice in education
(think of the rise of home schooling and the radical change in state laws making
it possible, even practicable); and, perhaps most pointedly, for the liberality of
Catholic schools. And we can see the effect upon the Court in a string of
permissive rulings on parochial school aid, 123 culminating in the decision
upholding the Cleveland voucher program in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.
124
What would closing down the judicial experiment with secularism look like
in terms of doctrine? Well, it would be a return to the Founders' vision, the
118. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
119. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc
(2000).
120. See Carl H. Esbeck, "Play in the Joints Between the Religious Clauses " and Other
Supreme Court Catecheses, "34 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1331, 1333-36 (2006).
121. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
122. Comm. For Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
123. See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
124. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
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vision captured in Justice Black's SecondEverson draft: cooperation between
church and state without coercion and without special favors to any one
church. 25 There are only two votes on the present Court for this rule of "sect-
equality." Justices Scalia and Thomas, in Lamb's Chapel, said that the
Constitution requires that aid to religion not discriminate between or among
faiths. 126 Justice Kennedy is the key variable. On the assumption that Roberts
and Alito make common cause with Thomas and Scalia, will he supply the
needed fifth vote to, finally, reject the secularism which has squatted in the
public square since 1962?
Kennedy has never been a "strict separationist." He joined in key parts of
the vigorous dissent written by Scalia in McCreary County v. ACLU, 127 the
Kentucky Ten Commandments display case from 2005. The McCreary dissent
which he joined was highly critical, not only of the majority's holding in that
case, but of the whole doctrinal patrimony generated by Lemon v. Kurtzman.
Is this a result to be hoped for? Justice White wrote in Nyquist that the Court
had long since lost meaningful contact with the Founding, and that the Justices
had "carved out what they deemed to be the most desirable national policy',1
28
on church-state issues.1 29 I think White was right: privatization has been a
judicial experiment-and an unfortunate one.
Born in '62, the privatization project has for almost two decades been in
decline. With a little more time and a little more experience we may be able to
judge it a fumbling, but plausible, transition from centuries of an implicit
Protestant establishment to what the Justices for a time could scarcely imagine:
religious liberty in a pluralistic society, one in which the government possesses
constitutional authority to aid and promote religion.
125. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
126. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 397-401 (Scalia &
Thomas, JJ., concurring).
127. McCreary County, Ky. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
128. Policy is contingent, time and place and context bound, revisable and surely not
infallible, a best guess, perhaps, about what the times require.
129. Comm. For Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 820 (1973).
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